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Abstract 
One of the main challenges of emergency management lies in communicating risks to the public. 
On some occasions, risk communicators might seek to increase awareness over emerging risks, 
while on others the aim might be to avoid escalation of public reactions. Social media accounts 
offer an opportunity to rapidly distribute critical information and in doing so to mitigate the 
impact of emergencies by influencing public reactions. This article draws on theories of risk and 
emergency communication in order to consider the impact of Twitter as a tool for 
communicating risks to the public. We analyse 10,020 Twitter messages posted by the official 
accounts of UK local government authorities (councils) in the context of two major emergencies: 
the heavy snow of December 2010 and the riots of August 2011. Twitter was used in a variety of 
ways to communicate and manage associated risks including messages to provide official 
updates, encourage protective behaviour, increase awareness and guide public attention to 
mitigating actions. We discuss the importance of social media as means of increasing confidence 
in emergency management institutions.  
1. Introduction 
When Hurricane Sandy hit the east coast of the United States in late October 2012, the popular 
microblogging application Twitter was extensively used as a hub of timely information provision 
to help people stay informed and safe. Public authorities such as the New York Fire Department 
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were able to provide essential support and even target the rescue of victims through the effective 
use of their Twitter account (CNN, 2012). This is only one of the highly visible cases where the 
immediacy of Twitter has proven valuable in emergency communication; others include 
tsunamis, floods and man-made violent incidents like terrorist attacks or food contamination (Al-
Saggaf and Simmons, 2014; Gaspar et al., 2016; Heverin and Zach, 2012; Oh et al., 2013). 
Twitter Alerts (2015), the network’s official warning system launched in 2013, helps users 
receive official emergency alerts from registered authorities such as police forces, ambulance 
services, meteorological and environment agencies.  
As a major technological innovation of recent years, social media applications have reshaped the 
nature of digital information sharing and networking. As part of this, they have come to function 
as spaces where both officials and citizens seek to interpret emergency situations and intervene 
accordingly (e.g. Macias et al., 2009; Neubaum et al., 2014; Palen et al., 2010). The relevance of 
social media has become evident in different aspects of communication before, during and after 
emergency events with Comfort et al. (2012, p. 547) noting that channels like Twitter and 
Facebook ‘are being rapidly integrated into disaster environments and warrant systematic study 
of their viability in support of improved public response’. Compared to previous work in 
information and knowledge management applications for emergency support (e.g. Dorasamy et 
al., 2013), social media have created much more open and ubiquitous information flows between 
authorities and the public. This is one of the reasons why Turoff et al. (2013) more specifically 
suggest that social media merit further attention with regard to their potential to engage with the 
public during emergencies. 
This paper focuses on the role of social media in communicating risks to the public during 
emergency events. Management of risk to the public is one of the main major challenges in 
emergency communication. It involves diverse strategies in terms of gathering information, 
setting standards and enforcing or suggesting particular behaviours to mitigate risks (e.g. Lodge, 
2009; Mileti, 1999; Sellnow and Seeger, 2013). Risk communication requires providing timely 
and reliable information to signal that authorities have the situation under control. Using this 
information, community members interpret emergency risks and make decisions about their own 
actions (Comfort, 2007; Kapucu, 2008). As a result, on some occasions, risk communicators 
might seek to increase awareness over emerging risks and alert the public, while on others the 
aim might be to reduce uncertainty and avoid escalation of reactions (Smith and McCloskey 
1998; ’t Hart, 2013).  
This challenge is increasingly addressed using social media platforms like Twitter. Within the 
technical confines of the particular social media platform being used, planning is required that 
attends to, anticipates and integrates increased levels of public engagement as well as framing 
risk messages that are attuned to public perceptions of the issue. Although studies have shown 
the importance and relevance of social media in emergencies, there is much to learn about how 
social media technologies enable – or constrain – risk communication and how they might best 
be deployed at different stages in the development and management of a crisis.  
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To situate our consideration of how social media can be used to communicate during emergency 
events, we draw on two theoretical perspectives in risk and emergency communication: the 
Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al. 1988) and the Crisis and 
Emergency Risk Communication model (CERC) (Reynolds and Seeger 2005). The combination 
of these perspectives facilitates an integrated consideration of risk communication themes and 
message framing (SARF) with the different emergency stages and risk reduction strategies 
suggested by CERC.  
The empirical part of the study focuses on the use of Twitter by local government authorities in 
the UK during the heavy snow of December 2010 and the summer riots of August 2011. These 
two high-impact emergencies of national reach required different types of responses from local 
government authorities (LGAs: known as councils in the UK). In December 2010, adverse 
weather over a long period of time required constant alertness to increase and maintain 
awareness of a range of risks. In the 2011 riots, authorities had to deal with uncertainty while 
actively attempting to reduce the effects of public disorder. Following an analysis of 8,274 LGA 
tweets from the 2010 snow and 1,746 from the 2011 riots, we identify the risk communication 
strategies that were used to influence public perception and actions as events unfolded during the 
two emergencies. On the basis of this analysis, we identify the scope and limitations of 
communicating risks to the public using social media. First, we outline the relevant literature and 
theoretical perspectives on emergency and risk communication.  
2. Emergency management, risk communication and social media 
Emergency management deals with a wide range of events that are unexpected, undesirable, 
disturb everyday life and affect a large number of people (Boin and ’t Hart 2010). Examples 
range from weather-related incidents (e.g. floods, fires) to transportation accidents, intentional 
events and civil disorders. Emergency management research has focused on issues such as inter-
organisational coordination, integrated planning risk mitigation, response and recovery, as well 
as how community resilience can be developed and sustained (Comfort et al., 2012, 2010; 
Zulean and Prelipcean, 2013). 
Relevant to several of these areas, communicating with the public during emergencies is a 
research domain in its own right. When unexpected events occur, there is high demand for 
information from the media, and from publics that may be affected, engaged or simply 
observing. Channels of timely, actionable and reliable information are of vital importance, 
especially in situations that involve high fear and uncertainty (Horsley and Barker 2002; Ansell 
et al. 2010). For information flows and high transparency to be established during emergencies, 
an open and flexible approach to communications is required (Harrald 2006; Somers and Svara 
2009). However, lack of time, limited resources, inter-organisational barriers and coordination 
difficulties commonly hinder organisations’ ability to meet the challenge (Hale 2005; Ansell et 
al. 2010). Alongside dealing with the actual events of an emergency, public organisations are 
increasingly required to exhibit transparency in the use of resources and manage expectations 
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about how they are dealing with a situation (Henstra, 2010). It is in this context that social media 
have become increasingly part of the armoury of communication practitioners. 
2.1. Social amplification of risk 
Organisational communication in emergencies in part will be shaped by the imagined 
characteristics and requirements of those to whom communications are directed (Barnett et al., 
2012). Such perceptions influence responses by authorities and the framing of risk messages. For 
example, one characteristic often attributed to the public  - for which in fact there is little 
evidence - is that people are likely to panic in response to a warning (Mileti and Peek, 2000). The 
Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) focuses on the discrepancies between public, 
stakeholder and organisational appraisals of risk events. The frequent lack of alignment between 
expert assessments of the situation and those of key actors constitute one of the major challenges 
in risk communication that SARF seeks to explain (Kasperson et al. 1988; Pidgeon et al. 2003).  
SARF was developed in order to systematise the findings of a disparate risk perception and 
communication literature and in particular to help explain why patterns of socio-political 
attention that surround a risk event are often of a different order (both in terms of the focus of 
that attention and its scale) than experts consider to be warranted. Thus, hazard events may 
attract considerable social attention and expressions of concern by publics, media or stakeholders 
yet experts may consider them to present a low risk (risk intensification) and, conversely, 
hazards designated as serious by experts might receive comparatively little attention (risk 
attenuation). SARF makes it clear that both individuals/experts, organisations as well as informal 
interactions can serve as ‘stations of amplification’ as they communicate in ways that may 
intensify or attenuate risk signals (Brenkert-Smith et al., 2013) or may indeed simply ‘re-present’ 
them (Breakwell and Barnett, 2003). Although organisations, viewed within SARF as social 
stations of amplification, cannot predict the impact of a risk message during emergencies, they 
need to accommodate diverse communication needs. They may view the nature of public 
concern and behaviour to warrant alerts about what are seen as emerging risks, seek to raise 
concern and generate action or seek to reduce uncertainty and avoid the escalation of reactions 
(Smith and McCloskey 1998; ’t Hart, 2013). Renn (1991) notes that in seeking to communicate 
risk, institutions frame messages using a combination of factual (simple information 
dissemination), inferential (inferring or directly mandating particular behavioural responses) and 
other more specialised components (e.g. value-related or symbolic that have particular meanings 
within a community). 
SARF provides a broad backdrop against which to consider organisational preparedness, 
highlighting the often wanted consequences of risk amplification (i.e. intensification or 
attenuation), and the required adaptation in the communication strategies of risk managers that 
are required as the flow of public and stakeholder actions are seen to exemplify amplification 
processes. However, SARF does not specify what characteristics of the information flow around 
an event are indicative of managerial competence, even though it is recognised as a major 
determinant of both public behaviour and of the broader impacts of the event (Burns et al. 1993; 
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Rickard et al. 2013). To more fully consider these indicators of competence, we turn to a second 
framework: the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication model (CERC) (Reynolds and 
Seeger, 2005).   
2.2. The Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication model 
The Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model was developed by the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention as a tool to structure and manage risk communication 
activities during public health emergencies (Reynolds & Seeger 2005). CERC is a crisis 
communication model that provides good connection to practice, even though it assumes a rather 
straightforward approach to how a crisis unfolds (Sellnow and Seeger, 2013). The strength of 
CERC as a guide for risk managers is evident in the links it makes between the common stages 
of a crisis and elements of good practice for communicating risks during each stage. The model 
also emphasises the importance of activities to transfer lessons from each individual emergency 
to the improvement of crisis response capabilities and public confidence in them. Table 1 shows 
the model’s stages and associated elements of good practice, adapted from Reynolds and Seeger 
(2005, p.52). It is an essential adjunct to SARF in framing the research perspective in this paper 
as it provides a set of indicators of good communication and managerial competence that are 
structured in relation to the stages of a crisis.  
In a further development and elaboration of the model, Veil et al. (2008) emphasise that since 
crises affect a wide variety of publics with diverse needs and resources, CERC is useful because 
it allows for flexibility in which risk reduction strategies a particular situation at a particular time 
might demand. Rickard et al. (2013) more explicitly contend that the combination of SARF and 
CERC can be helpful for considering not only the origin of risk management crises but also how 
using appropriate risk reduction strategies may help to resolve these. Here SARF offers a useful 
frame to understand which risk events may result in intensification or attenuation and why, while 
CERC offers guidance on how organisations can influence the course of a risk event. An early 
assessment of what might affect patterns of risk intensification or attenuation and appropriate 
management actions may limit the extent of crises or at least facilitate their smooth resolution 
(Rickard et al., 2013). 
Emergency stages Communication aims and good practice 
Precrisis 
 Monitoring and recognition of emerging risks 
 Warnings regarding eminent threats and precautionary messages 
 Changes in behaviour to reduce likelihood of harm 
 Development of recommendations by experts and first respondents 
Initial event 
 Reduce uncertainty and emotional turmoil  
 Establish official sources of information  
 Announce anticipated outcomes 
 Improve understanding of self-efficacy and personal response activities 
(what to do and how to get more information) 
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Emergency stages Communication aims and good practice 
Maintenance 
 Facilitate more accurate understanding of ongoing risk, background factors 
and issues 
 Support and cooperation with response and recovery efforts 
 Feedback from the public and correction of any misunderstandings/rumours 
 Ongoing uncertainty reduction, re-iteration of self-efficacy and personal 
response activities from the previous stage 
Resolution 
 Inform about recovery and rebuilding efforts 
 Improve public understanding of new risks and risk avoidance behaviours  
 Facilitate discussion and resolution of issues regarding responsibility, 
blame and adequacy of response  
 Promote the activities and capacities of emergency organisations to 
reinforce positive identity and image 
Evaluation 
 Assess responses and communication effectiveness  
 Document, formalise and communicate lessons learnt 
 Create linkages to precrisis activities 
 Determine actions to improve crisis response capabilities 
Table 1: Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication model (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005, p.52). 
2.3. Social media in emergency and risk communication  
Empirical work framed in terms of SARF or CERC has barely attended to the role of social 
media in communicating and managing risks. Within SARF, traditional media are a key social 
station of risk amplification and there is broad agreement as to which characteristics of an issue 
are most likely to attract media attention (Pidgeon and Barnett, 2013). However, the use of social 
media represents a step change in how organisations can communicate about risk and in crisis 
situations. Although it has long been emphasised that risk communication is a two-way process 
(e.g. Pidgeon, et al., 2003), the advent of social media turns this principle into clear practical 
reality: organisational messages can be supplemented, contested and reproduced (or not) far 
beyond their original intended audience.  
Indeed, early assessments of social media in risk communication have noted that new issues can 
be uncovered and quickly result in intensification or attenuation before organisations are able to 
react or guide to desired actions (Chung, 2011; Veil et al., 2011). Jung and Park (2014) map the 
dynamic evolution of risk communication networks where intermediary actors clearly act as 
stations of amplification in terms of diffusing information and mitigating the impact of an 
outside attack. Al-Saggaf and Simmons (2014) further show how amplification on social media 
can even escalate from crisis incidents to issues of political accountability and blame.  
Incorporating a consideration of the deployment of social media around risk and crisis 
communication by stakeholders and publics represents a considerable research agenda. This 
would need to attend to, for example, how social media enable organisations to communicate 
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directly with citizens and the impact of doing so, the role of individual citizens in communicating 
risk (perhaps requiring a more differentiated picture of individual stations of amplification), how 
traditional media interacts with social media, and, of particular interest to this paper, how 
particular features of social media platforms enable – or constrain – risk communication and how 
they might best be deployed at different stages in the development and management of a crisis.  
There has been a great deal of work that focuses on the role of social media and crisis 
communication more generally as noted in early reviews of this area (Rains et al., 2014; Veil et 
al., 2011; Wendling et al., 2013) and the role of microblogs in this has received sustained 
attention with Twitter being highly influential and distinctive. Twitter started in 2006 as a brief 
announcement service where users could follow others (with ‘following’ not being a reciprocal 
relationship). Twitter’s conversational features were gradually established to support user 
interactions and the structuring of information (e.g. Marwick and Boyd, 2011). First, users are 
enabled to directly address other users or refer to them in conversations using the symbol ‘@ 
(e.g. @XXX). Second, users can ‘retweet’ or reproduce another user’s message in its original or 
modified form. Third, users can follow streams of updates through keywords which are 
thematically organised around the symbol ‘#’ (hashtag), which is self-assigned to messages by 
users themselves (e.g. #LondonRiots). In addition, tweets often contain media content or 
hyperlinks to other material.  
Due to these features, Twitter has radically changed the way emergency information is socially 
distributed. Without replacing traditional media sources, Twitter has become a virtual space 
where many Internet users turn to seek emergency details; tweets might even come from users 
from the epicentre of disasters such as earthquakes (Murthy, 2013). During events that draw 
attention, tweets can be propagated on the ad hoc networks of users and quickly reach outside 
previously established relationships (Marwick and Boyd 2011). Network effects are facilitated 
by one-click actions like replies and retweets, or evolve around unmediated conversations 
enabled by hashtags. As a result, large scale computational techniques applied on Twitter data 
can be useful to detect unexpected incidents and overview public reactions or the mobilisation of 
emergency response networks (Burnap et al., 2013; Jung and Park, 2016). 
Despite warnings that such interactions might be simply about rapid distribution of factual 
information (Helsloot and Groenendaal, 2013), the relevance of Twitter in emergency and risk 
communication has been evident. For example, Twitter can be used for collective sense-making 
during civil unrest incidents (Heverin and Zach 2012), as a warning tool in natural disasters 
(Chatfield et al., 2013) or as means of coping with the stressful effects of a food contamination 
incident (Gaspar et al., 2016). Emergency activity on Twitter that starts with factual information 
can involve waves of public reaction that directly impact ongoing events, especially when they 
involve high uncertainty. Despite assumptions that the spreading of rumours might lead to 
intensified risk perceptions, most emergency information on Twitter has been found to be of high 
quality; untrue rumours are likely to be dismissed by other users and not spread disproportionally 
(Guardian, 2012). Using rumour theory, Oh et al. (2013) established that it is not ambiguity in 
the content of tweets that results in rumours but rather ambiguity about the source or the context. 
Rumour may also be associated with unwanted attenuation of risk perceptions if, for example it 
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drew attention away from officially sanctioned positions like the cause of food contamination or 
the treatment of subsequent illness (Gaspar et al., 2016). If faced with an inappropriate lack of 
concern, authorities would then wish to correct this analysis and intensify, or perhaps more 
accurately, de-attenuate, by ensuring that proportionate attention and concern was linked to 
appropriate actions and levels of vigilance. 
Therefore, from the perspective of SARF, the use of Twitter by those responsible for risk 
management can have a role in the intensification or attenuation of risk-related messages and are 
aimed at encouraging officially sanctioned actions. Previous studies have mainly looked at these 
effects using tweets, the relevance of which is assigned in respect of the presence of keywords or 
hashtags (e.g. Gaspar et al., 2016; Heverin and Zach, 2012). Such evaluations can shed light on 
public perceptions of risk and risk amplification processes during major events like pandemics 
(Chew and Eysenbach, 2010). The approach in the current study has been to analyse all the 
Twitter communications made by particular actors and, in line with CERC, the focus of attention 
is on how Twitter is used to communicate, the nature of this communication and how this varied 
at different stages of a crisis.  
3. Research approach 
To empirically investigate the use of social media to communicate risks to the public, we focus 
on local government emergencies in the UK. In many countries like the UK, local governments 
have the main responsibility for planning and response even for emergencies that concern large 
areas and are of national reach (Henstra, 2010). In many cases, UK councils are expected to take 
a leading role in emergency coordination and communicating risks on behalf of several agencies 
involved (e.g. police or fire services) 1. Kavanaugh et al. (2012) suggest that social media might 
be used in local government emergencies on a relatively ad hoc basis without clear appreciation 
of the risk communication challenges. Many local governments are likely to be in the process of 
developing expertise of monitoring reactions on social media and intervening accordingly.  
The methodology used in this study broadly belongs to digital research methods, which 
encompasses different techniques for the collection and analysis of data produced via the Internet 
(Fielding et al., 2008). Following data collection, we classify tweets according to their thematic 
and risk communication content and then discuss the findings by considering the CERC stages of 
good practice given the different nature of the two emergencies. 
3.1. Data collection and case selection 
Twitter is very popular in the UK with over 15 million users (rising from 10 million in 2012), 
most of which are active via mobile devices. Twitter has been extensively used by government 
authorities at different levels, including councils, mainly since 2008. To identify UK councils 
                                                 
1 More details can be found in the UK government’s (2013) emergency response and recovery guidance. 
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using Twitter, the @Directgov/ukcouncils was consulted, which was an official list aggregating 
187 general Twitter accounts of UK councils at the time of the study 2.  A large dataset of over 
300,000 posts made by those accounts was retrieved within 2012 via the Twitter’s Application 
Programming Interface (API) 3. For the scope of this study, a total of 10,020 tweets were 
selected and analysed in relation to the heavy snow of December 2010 and the summer riots of 
August 2011. These two national emergencies were selected due to their high impact and distinct 
characteristics; this corresponds to the diverse and influential case selection criteria for 
exploratory research recommended by Seawright and Gerring (2008). 
The UK winter of 2010, also known as the Big Freeze, was a meteorological event that started at 
the end of November 2010 and lasted until the end of December 2010 (Met Office 2011). Those 
five weeks involved a long period of extreme weather that demanded continuous alertness and 
action by councils as the principal emergency authority. Emergency information had to raise 
awareness over weather conditions and, in a situation where risk managers may wish to avoid 
people’s over-familiarity with the issues, seek to de-attenuate public reactions to ongoing and yet 
often unpredictable and invisible risks such as driving on icy roads (Breakwell and Barnett 
2003). In contrast, the 2011 riots were a largely unfamiliar civil disorder situation marked by 
high uncertainty about its causes and effects over a period of five days in August 2011 (Riots 
Panel 2011). Emergency communicators had to use all available information channels to manage 
public perceptions of events, to reduce uncertainty about the extent of disorders, discourage 
rioters from taking part and both to warn and reassure. Although dealing with public disorder is 
mainly the responsibility of police authorities, affected councils took an active role in managing 
the riots.  
3.2. Data analysis 
The filtering, selection and analysis of tweets were carried out using MS Excel and NVivo. From 
all tweets posted by LGAs during November/December 2010 and August 2011, only the 
emergency-related ones were selected for further analysis in each case respectively. For the 2010 
snowfalls, due to the high volume and duration of events, the number of tweets had to be further 
narrowed down to the period 1-23 December 2010, which included the escalation of snowfalls 
around the beginning and middle of December 2010 (Met Office 2011). This led to a total of 
8,274 tweets emanating from the majority of LGAs across the UK. The investigation of the 2011 
riots focused on 1,746 messages mostly from London councils and other metropolitan areas in 
England where public disorder took place. The 1,746 tweets were posted during a period of five 
days from the 9th to the 13th of August 2011.  
                                                 
2 The 187 accounts included 13 councils from Scotland, 12 from Wales, Belfast City Council from Northern Ireland 
and 161 councils from England including 28 London Boroughs. The list was created by the Department of 
Communities and Local Government and maintained as accurately as possible until 2012.  
 
3 Data were retrieved from Twitter’s API using a customised data collection tool developed by a member of the 
research team. Based on the API’s restriction’s, the tool allowed the collection of up to the 3,200 most recent tweets 
by each account listed by @Directgov/ukcouncils. 
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The 8,274 snow tweets from December 2010 and the 1,746 riot tweets from August 2011 were 
coded as separate cases to systematically analyse their content and classify emerging themes in 
each emergency situation. An open coding approach was used, which is common for studies that 
examine the posting characteristics of specific Twitter users or conversations (e.g. Waters and 
Williams 2011; Heverin and Zach 2012). This approach comes from traditional qualitative 
content analysis methods (Krippendorff, 2013) and is adapted for short texts such as tweets with 
specific structural elements (e.g. hashtags and mentions). The open coding was implemented by 
two coders who identified initial patterns using keyword frequency and distribution within the 
messages. This gave a first indication of the tweets’ content and the main patterns that are likely 
to be selected in the final dataset (e.g. words like “school” and “road” appeared in a large 
proportion of tweets from December 2010, which strongly indicated that they needed to be 
treated as separate categories). After several rounds of reading of the whole dataset, initial 
patterns were then further developed and adapted, which eventually led to seven main content 
categories for each case. Since this process was not based on subjective assessment of the 
meaning of the tweets, any ambiguities between coders were resolved by agreement before 
finalising the themes. The seven categories for each case are nonexclusive as tweets could 
contain meaning that is relevant to more than just one of them; 13.7% and 21.6% of tweets in 
each case had to be classified in two categories.  
The frequency of tweets was examined as an indication of how the volume of messages 
corresponded to the nature of actual risk events (Renn, 1991, p. 296). It was expected that the 
volume of tweets would fluctuate according to the intensity of the crisis. As part of assigning 
tweets to themes we also sought to classify tweets in relation to Renn’s (1991, p. 300) categories 
of message components. Given the context of our dataset and the brief nature of tweets, message 
components were mostly factual or inferential. Factual information relates to the content or the 
source of the message (e.g. a road is blocked). Inferential messages refer to the conclusions that 
can be drawn from the evidence (e.g. care is needed on road x due to ice). Messages with value-
related or symbolic components were less evident in our analysis (evaluation of messages against 
value criteria or symbolic meanings). We relate these message components to amplification 
potential through the work of Sutton et al. (2013) who find that warning tweets containing clear 
and specific calls for actions encouraging protective behaviour are more likely to be passed on. 
Identifying factual and inferential tweets provides an analytic distinction that can be useful in 
characterising the amplification potential of messages regarding the spread of information. The 
next two sections present the findings of each case respectively. 
4. Raising awareness: heavy snow in December 2010 
Heavy snowfalls started during the last week of November 2010 and turned into relentless snow 
showers during the period between 29 November and 3 December. By early December, most of 
the UK was covered with snow; accumulations in the north and east of Scotland and England 
were over 50cm in places, with over 1m of snow lying on much of the Scottish mountains. 
Indicatively, on the 2nd of December, over 100 motorists were stranded on the north motorways, 
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two teenage girls died in a car crash caused by ice and more than 7,000 schools remained closed 
(BBC 2010). On that day, an extremely heavy belt of snow affected Southern England and 
resulted in the closure of three main motorways. Exceptionally low temperatures were recorded 
in major towns and cities (e.g. -18 °C in Aberdeen, Scotland). The heavy snowfalls and record 
low temperatures during this period resulted in major transport disruptions, school closures, 
power failures, the postponement of events, and even several casualties across the country. 
International airports were also heavily affected, particularly London Heathrow, which remained 
closed for four consecutive days from the 18th of December. Snowfalls continued during most of 
the month, with milder weather pushed across the UK only from the 26th to the 27th.  
From the end of November 2010, councils in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
initiated emergency procedures to monitor the situation, improve awareness among the public 
and ensure the safety of local communities. Activity on Twitter increased accordingly to the 
local significance and intensity of events. Figure 1 shows the distribution of tweets over the 24 
days analysed and confirms the volume effect in line with the actual timeline of snow intensity 
(Met Office 2011). The peak of Twitter activity in the periods 1-3, 6-9 and 17-22 December 
2010 includes the heaviest snow showers within the month when communication needs raised 
accordingly to provide official information and emphasise the seriousness of the situation with a 
combination of advice and warnings.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of tweet volumes, 1-23 December 2010 
The 8,274 messages were examined in relation to their content in a coding process that resulted 
in the seven thematic categories shown in table 2 in decreasing order of frequency. Both factual 
and inferential components were present in most thematic categories. Reflecting on the stages 
and good practice activities of the CERC model, it is important to consider how the 8,274 tweets 
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were spread across the pattern of adverse weather over a period of 24 days. Figure 2 shows how 
tweets from the seven thematic categories were distributed over this period. The proportion of 
different communication themes during each day can be read as indicative of desired reactions 
from the public and as seeking to convey managerial competence. 
When snow waves were expected (precrisis), tweets emphasised the need to take precautionary 
measures and increase awareness, arguably to warn, to lessen attenuated public perceptions and 
to indicate that a heightened response was required. Strongly inferential messages devoted to 
advice, updates and warnings were posted at this stage (e.g. on the 4th, and within the 14-16 
period). Many of these messages aimed at increasing awareness over the risk of incoming snow, 
including retweets of messages originally posted by police authorities, the met office, local 
citizens, the media and other accounts. 
 
Category Examples 
Risk amplification 
components 
School updates 
Updates about 
school 
openings, 
closures and 
other relevant 
issues.  
33.4% 
 
“Head Teachers continue to review the position of their 
individual schools. Parents will be alerted if pupils are to 
be dismissed early.” 
“All schools and nurseries closed to pupils tomorrow 
Thursday 9 December. “  
Factual to announce 
which schools will be 
open or closed. Details 
about transportation or 
the state of facilities 
were also included. 
“Many schools are staying open in spite of the snowy 
conditions. Parents and pupils check yours here http://...” 
“Parents should make a judgment about whether to send 
children to school. We understand that it may be a difficult 
journey for some” 
Inferential messages 
asked parents and 
school staff to make 
their own decisions 
about attending on 
specific days.   
Cleaning 
activities 
Updates about 
cleaning the 
streets from the 
snow and ice. 
17.6% 
 
“We have used around 2800 tonnes of salt since the start of 
the winter. Currently we are using an average of 600 
tonnes per day.” 
“Priority route gritting continues throughout the night. No 
further snow forecast but temperature in city likely to fall 
to -10C.” 
“Primary roads and footways gritted in advance of 
possible snow showers coming from the east today. Further 
grit this evening.” 
Factual messages 
contained information 
about: (1) the 
availability and use of 
gritting (2) apologies to 
those affected and (3) 
acknowledgement of 
cleaning limitations 
(e.g. omitting smaller 
streets).  
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State of council 
and other local 
services 
Updates about 
recycling, local 
transportation 
and other 
services.  
16.9% 
 
“We apologise to all of our residents who have had 
disruptions to their bin and recycling collections over the 
last couple of days.” 
 “Special needs and social care transport will not run due 
to the risk to vulnerable passengers” 
“Service disruptions: Read the full statement on 
disruptions to council services due to severe weather 
conditions at http://...” 
Factual to announce 
information about 
services including: (1) 
justification of council 
actions to deal with the 
situation, (2) apologies 
to those affected and (3) 
retweets of messages by 
other service providers 
(e.g. buses). 
“Residents are also being advised to put excess household 
waste in their brown garden waste bin until full service is 
resumed.” 
Inferential messages 
asked residents to assist 
in waste collection, 
avoid specific routes or 
be patient until full 
services are resumed. 
Information 
about roads and 
drivers 
Updates about 
the condition of 
roads and 
advice for 
drivers.  
15.1% 
“Drivers are warned of continuing treacherous conditions 
on Devon's roads after temperatures of -14C in places 
causes snow to become ice.”  
“Highways advice: don't be deceived by today's blue skies 
& fading snow; it will stay below freezing this weekend so 
ice is a danger.” 
Factual messages 
informed about the 
condition of roads and 
how traffic was affected 
by the weather. 
“Drivers: Be aware of pedestrians, using salted roads to 
walk along to avoid slippery icy pavements tomorrow.” 
“Please be careful on the roads this morning. Ice is likely 
to be the biggest danger especially on minor and 
residential roads #Plymouth” 
 “Please if you're driving clear snow off your car roof 
before leaving. It could slip while moving and block your 
view.” 
Inferential messages 
contained strong 
precautions about 
driving and expressions 
of care related to 
vehicle maintenance, 
pedestrians and 
deteriorating weather 
conditions. 
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Response to 
queries and 
others 
Replies to 
questions, 
requests for 
information and 
other direct 
mentions to 
accounts. 
12.3% 
“@*** You can see the routes on this map http://... and 
here's info on winter maintenance plan http://...” 
“@*** we are responsible for 5 000 miles of roads (not 
just Sevenoaks) and our 66 gritters and snow ploughs are 
doing the best they can” 
“@*** We know the situation is bad but please bear with 
us as we are trying our best to help as many people and 
areas as possible” 
A combination of 
factual and inferential 
messages in response to 
requests for information 
and other direct 
contacts.  
Mostly related to details 
about the actions of the 
council to deal with the 
snow and how to 
receive updates. 
Events and 
venues 
Information 
about the 
opening/closure 
of facilities and 
cancellation of 
events.  
9.5% 
“All our sports pitches including pitches at leisure centres 
remain closed due to the ice and snow.” 
 “All the borough's libraries are closing at 4pm because of 
the bad weather.” 
 “The show must go on! Playhouse panto matinee and 
evening performances are going ahead. Oh yes they are!” 
Factual to announce 
information about 
events and the state of 
venues like leisure 
facilities and libraries. 
Advice, updates 
and warnings 
General 
updates, advice, 
statements from 
local leaders 
and other 
situation 
description 
messages.  
8.9% 
 “If you are aware of someone who is vulnerable and is at 
risk due to the cold weather please contact Adult Services 
on ***.” 
“No major snow overnight but still threat of freezing rain 
this afternoon. Please take care when out and about.” 
“Please take care. Ice or large amounts of snow falling 
from buildings can be dangerous.” 
“As sleet/snow melts and temperatures then begin to drop 
overnight residents are asked to take extra care due to a 
very high risk of ice.” 
Inferential messages 
with strong expressions 
of care and advice about 
how to protect public 
safety.  
 
Table 2: Thematic categories and examples for the snow tweets, 1-23 December 2010. 
Uncertainty reduction was more intense while snow waves were in progress (initial event) with 
several reminders before most local issues were resolved (resolution). During snow waves, 
inferential tweets related to the condition of roads, actions to support snow cleaning and other 
self-efficacy or precautionary measures. Depending on how critical the message was, a few 
tweets contained direct risk assessment propositions such as ‘drive at your own risk’. 
Furthermore, given the long duration of events (maintenance), residents were likely to become 
familiar with risks such as driving or walking on icy roads. To address this, specifically targeted 
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tweets aimed at intensifying public reactions through reminders of the existence and high impact 
of weather conditions on individuals and council resources. Most public queries were received at 
this stage (12.3% of all messages), so that tweets could be used to collect information and 
identify areas of attention based on feedback by residents and local organisations. Following the 
recovery stage, there was no evidence of discussions about adequacy response and lessons learnt 
(evaluation); such reflections probably took place in less constraining and immediate spaces than 
Twitter’s 140 characters. 
Although public response to messages from different categories cannot be measured in detail, if 
we consider retweets as an indicator of influence (e.g. Marwick and Boyd 2011; Sutton 2013) it 
seems that factual information about openings and closures had the clearest impact. Probably due 
to the size of their population, accounts from major city councils tweeted more during the two 
emergencies and their tweets drew higher evidence of attention in the form of retweets (e.g. ‘All 
schools and nurseries closed to pupils tomorrow Thursday 9 December’ by Glasgow City 
Councils was retweeted 145 times).  
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of thematic categories for the snow tweets, 1-23 December 2010. 
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5. Managing uncertainty: the riots of August 2011  
The widespread public disorder for five days in August 2011 across major cities in England was 
an exceptional event marked by high uncertainty. The riots started in London Tottenham on 
Saturday 6th of August 2011, following protests caused by the death of a local man named Mark 
Duggan by the London Metropolitan Police two days earlier. From 8th to the 10th of August 
disorders spread rapidly across London and nationally leading to a total of 66 areas affected, 
including cities such as Bristol, Manchester and Birmingham. About 13,000 - 15,000 people 
were actively involved in the riots, five people lost their lives and hundreds more lost their 
businesses and homes in a total estimated cost of over half a billion pounds (Riots Panel 2011). 
The majority of crimes were committed in London (68%), including many incidents of violence 
against individuals, arson and criminal damages, thefts and shop looting. Riots de-escalated 
when 16,000 patrolling police forces were deployed in London on the 10th of August. In parallel, 
the London Metropolitan Police started a robust campaign to arrest suspected rioters through the 
monitoring of over 200,000 hours of closed circuit television (CCTV) footages. Another 
influential event was the peace-rally called by Tariq Jahan whose son was killed during riots in 
Birmingham.  
Social media were extensively used during the riots by all involved parties. Twitter specifically 
gained a central role as part of a massive flow of information about the riots in traditional and 
digital media. Despite initial assumptions, mainly by media and political leaders, studies showed 
that social media were not used to promote illegal activities, but much more to describe the 
events, condemn the riots, raise donations and express solidarity to local communities (Guardian, 
2012). An exception to this was the BlackBerry Messenger (BBM) which, due to its cheap cost, 
efficiency and security, was used by rioting groups as an organising tool (Guardian, 2011). An 
analysis of over 2.5m tweets by the Guardian (2012) team found that Twitter was mainly used by 
authorities and individuals to organise clean-up activities, which was an idea suggested by 
Twitter users and supported by the Mayor of London. Over 60,000 volunteers were mobilised in 
the most affected areas of London and other cities to clean the streets from the riots. Hashtags 
like #LondonRiots and #RiotCleanup used to organise these activities were estimated to have 
reached over 7 million Twitter users. Police forces used Twitter mainly for broadcasting 
purposes instead of intervening and systematically gathering information, which proved difficult 
due to the speed of events (Procter et al., 2013). However, the initiative to identify suspects 
following the release of CCTV images of rioters by the police proved to be very popular.  
The 1,746 tweets analysed were posted by 81 councils from the 9th to the 13th of August 2011 
while the riots were taking place across England or shortly after. Even though the initial reaction 
of councils to the incidents was rather late, Twitter was used extensively from the 9th. Figure 3 
shows the distribution of tweets over the five days. The volume effect is clear, as this number of 
tweets would normally correspond to a whole month of activity instead of five days. Most tweets 
were posted over the first two days when riots were in progress and uncertainty was high. In 
subsequent days, the peak of activity around noon was due to tweets related to the events of the 
previous night and the organisation of cleaning activities later the same day. The different types 
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of messages posted by councils reveal a combination of risk communication strategies to reduce 
uncertainty and attempt to influence actual events. The 1,746 tweets were related to the seven 
categories of content described in table 3. Unlike the 2010 snow tweets, most thematic categories 
have a clear factual and inferential focus, both aiming at the fastest possible resolution of the 
emergency and the attenuation of public perceptions. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of tweet volumes, 9-13 August 2011 
The stages and good practice activities of the CERC model can illuminate the proportion of 
different communication themes over the five days (figure 4). Due to the man-made nature of the 
riots, we can observe significant differences in the nature of Twitter communication as events 
unfolded. Twitter use during the riots followed the sudden escalation of disorder (initial event) 
and there was no opportunity to observe a precrisis stage. Tweets were however clearly deployed 
to support councils’ efforts to attenuate public stress and avoid the possible escalation of the 
riots. To serve this purpose, a large number of factual messages included official announcements, 
statements from local leaders, retweets of messages from the police and replies to other accounts 
that sought information about the situation (situation description theme). Those messages 
contributed to collective sense making and provided links for further information on council 
websites or other original sources. Due to the uncertainty about the extent of the riots in city 
neighbourhoods, timely information was of vital importance to reinstate public order and prevent 
the spreading of panic; as shown in figure 4, tweets preventing rumours mainly appeared during 
the first two days. 
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Category Examples 
Risk amplification 
components 
Press release, 
announcement or 
statement 
Press releases, 
announcements 
and statements by 
local leaders, 
officers in charge 
or the police.   
34.9% 
“Press release: Harlow Council leader Andrew Johnson 
praises young people in Harlow for tackling baseless riot 
rumours on social media” 
“Statement from Birmingham City Council on unrest calling 
or calm and business as usual in the city tomorrow 
http://...” 
“The leader of the council has made a statement about the 
disorder and the concerns of local people. Read it here: 
http://...” 
Factual about the 
situation and actions 
of authorities.  
 
Situation 
description 
Information about 
the situation in 
response to queries 
or actions in 
progress.  
29.7% 
“It's business as usual in Solihull - we'll be working closely 
with @WMPolice to keep a close eye on things and will 
keep you updated” 
“West Midlands Police are reassuring communities that the 
situation this evening is one of calm across the region.” 
“We've been dealing with an incident in Morrisons car 
park. Police on scene situation under control. Number of 
arrests ...” 
Factual, with 
evidence about the 
situation being 
extrapolated to 
inferences as to how 
to stay safe. 
Community 
appraisal  
Public appraisal of 
those participating 
in community 
recovery events 
like cleaning 
actions and 
fundraising.   
16.9% 
“Thanks to everyone who has turned up to help with the 
cleanup. We've got most of it done now. Business as usual 
here. #salfordriotcleanup” 
“Thanks everyone for your offers of help to #cleanuptelford 
- we'll keep you posted” 
“Most of the clean up is now underway or has already been 
completed but a very big thank you to everyone who has 
offered to clean up” 
Community 
acknowledgements 
appear to be mostly 
factual but act as 
encouragement for 
more public input, 
especially since 
many of them were 
posted while riots 
were in progress. 
Clean-up actions 
Coordinating or 
supporting actions 
to clean the streets.  
12.9% 
“The core of the city has been cleaned. We'd still welcome 
help with smaller streets but may be less to do than expected 
#Manchester” 
“All is now calm in Wellington town centre and our street 
cleaning operation has been completed. http://...” 
“RT @***: At the bethnal green clean up nice to see so 
many people ready to help in the community!” 
“Please wait for announcements about a cleanup this 
Inferential to ask 
people to support 
cleaning actions 
organised by 
councils, local 
citizens or other 
groups. 
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afternoon. We need to make sure areas are safe first.” 
Legal actions 
Information and 
warnings about 
legal actions in 
progress against 
potential offenders 
or those arrested 
on the spot.  
11.7% 
“Lots of warrants being executed this morning and people 
being arrested from last night.” 
“We have started knocking on doors to arrest people. We 
arrested a total of 888 people in connection with disorders.” 
“We will not take action against any parent who reports 
their child to police for rioting” 
“Our housing provider Salix will be taking legal action and 
potentially evicting tenants involved in the riots” 
Messages in this 
category appear to 
be factual but are 
indirectly inferential 
to: (1) ensure the 
general public that 
law enforcement is 
in progress and (2) 
warn offenders to 
stop engaging in 
disorder. 
Preventing 
rumours  
Disproving 
rumours broadly or 
with direct 
reference to other 
users’ tweets.  
8.9% 
“All is calm across Stoke-on-Trent and Staffs - ignore the 
rumours there is nothing to report” 
“RT @gmpolice: Rumours and gossip everywhere - NO 
disorder at the moment. Follow this official Twitter feed and 
we will keep everyone updated” 
“All quiet in Smethwick and West Bromwich this morning. 
Please do not spread rumours on Twitter and Facebook  
reliable updates from @WMPolice” 
Balanced factual and 
inferential as they 
contained updates 
about the situation 
and strongly directed 
individuals to stop 
spreading rumours 
using online or 
offline means.  
Information 
seeking  
Seeking public 
assistance to 
identify suspected 
rioters.  
6.6% 
“#UKriots: help name the criminals and find out what you 
can do to stay safe http://...  #stoptheriots #londonriots” 
“You can give @GMPolice info about the #salfordriots by 
using this web page http://.... It lets you upload videos 
photos + docs.” 
“RT @gmpolice: Check out our pics and help us Shop a 
Looter. http://...” 
Inferential to seek 
public input in 
identifying 
offenders.   
Includes many 
retweeted messages 
or calls from police 
forces or other ad 
hoc campaigns. 
Table 3: Thematic categories and examples for the riots tweets, 9-13 August 2011. 
It is important to observe that, following this initial response, the public was seen as a resource to 
mitigate the impact of the riots and establish transitional actions between the maintenance and 
the resolution stage. Inferential tweets were posted mostly at these stages and attempted to 
influence public behaviour by promoting collaborative actions to clean the streets while seeking 
input to identify offenders and strongly warning those at the streets for the consequences of their 
actions. Even tweets that appeared to be informational, actually guided the public into specific 
actions implicitly. For example, legal actions in progress aimed to affect offenders’ willingness 
to engage in riots on the spot, as they were likely to receive updates via their mobile devices. The 
proportion of tweets about legal actions increased during the five days. Together with appeals to 
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identify offenders from CCTV images (information seeking theme), those tweets were influential 
in reducing disorder and restoring faith in the ability of authorities to react effectively. 
Furthermore, repeatedly expressing gratitude about community mobilisation to clean the streets 
aimed to encourage more people to take part or promote the initiatives on their own networks. 
Overall, these three inferential communication themes aimed at accelerating the resolution stage 
by providing people a variety of ways to get involved, even by a single retweet for those 
observing the riots outside their local areas (re-iteration of self-efficacy). 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of thematic categories for the snow tweets, 1-23 December 2010. 
6. Discussion 
The analysis of the 10,020 tweets shows that LGAs used a variety of risk communication 
strategies related to social amplification processes. First, they significantly increased the pure 
volume of broadcasted information to intensify awareness and provide frequent timely updates. 
Second, they filtered and reproduced information from other resources to take advantage of the 
high visibility of their accounts (e.g. to ensure that police warnings or weather updates maximise 
their reach). Third, LGAs framed their own Twitter messages to lead public attention to alerts, 
warnings, updates and proposed actions. Original tweets produced by LGAs, together with 
retweets and replies, were spreading as official sources of information, hence being part of an 
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discuss the changing nature of emergency communication due to the new role of social media. 
We then expand and reflect on the study’s implications for theory. 
6.1. Communicating risks to the public on social media 
An important starting point for consideration is the value of Twitter to improve confidence in 
emergency management institutions. Many tweets from both cases were devoted to information 
about emergency decisions, use of resources and progress of risk assessment activities. The level 
of detail provided by brief frequent messages can improve adaptability to emerging risks by 
building an informed community, for example, addressing queries from the public, sharing and 
promoting actions in progress by individuals and organisations (e.g. effective coordination of riot 
clean-up) or providing support with emotional coping (Gaspar et al., 2016). This is important 
since previous work has indicated that if the public does not perceive emergency management 
activities as adequate, there might be issues of political accountability or attempts by non-
institutional actors to influence public perceptions (Al-Saggaf and Simmons, 2014).  
In the case of the 2010 snowfalls, Twitter was extensively used to manage expectations over the 
reach and limitations of emergency resources. Tweets informed about numbers of resources used 
to grit and salt the streets, risks that had to be accepted such as leaving ice on secondary routes 
and how waste collection was prioritised when vehicles could not reach certain areas. Many 
tweets also directly addressed queries from the public about these issues. This function of 
Twitter can be of particular value in large-scale emergencies like weather conditions, when 
public managers face pressures to demonstrate the effective allocation of resources (Boin and  ’t 
Hart, 2010; Henstra, 2010).  
In the case of the 2011 riots, there was an ongoing struggle to show that authorities had the 
situation under control. Most themes of Twitter communication were clearly aligned with this 
objective, with many of them aiming to clarify ambiguities about the source of publicly 
distributed information or directly disprove rumours (Oh et al., 2013). The style of tweets 
adapted accordingly to show the alertness of authorities and decisiveness of actions in progress 
(e.g. legal actions, disproving rumours). One would expect that authorities would maintain a 
traditionally official tone but many of the tweets deviated from this norm were informative in an 
informal way (e.g. “Colleague at meeting with police confirms nothing of note has happened in 
the borough. We and police will continue to keep our eyes open”). This is arguably one of the 
few cases that actions by authorities and local communities co-evolved around activities like 
cleaning the streets and identifying suspects (Panagiotopoulos et al., 2014).  
Following from the latter, it is important to note that compared to traditional risk and emergency 
communications, social media interventions take place in spaces where official accounts are not 
isolated but act as hubs within a broader flow of information during emergencies (Jung and Park, 
2014; 2016). Being able to communicate as part of a network is a major change for emergency 
authorities compared to traditional one-way models where public responses are neither 
anticipated nor visible. In the two cases, LGA accounts occupied a central position as a 
trustworthy source of information in emergency flows both to inform communities about issues 
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within their responsibility (e.g. waste collection, schools or public venues) as well as to make 
risk assessment propositions about the condition of roads or the state of transportation services. 
Good practice suggests that the public has to be made aware of how updates will be posted and 
which other information sources are trustworthy and relevant (e.g. transportation or utility 
companies) (Mergel, 2013). To a large extent, these relationships will emerge ad hoc and 
sustaining them can be critical to turn channels like Twitter Alerts to useful risk management 
tools.  
6.2. Theoretical implications 
The Social Amplification of Risk Framework sensitised us to considering how Twitter messages 
might relate to risk amplification where LGA accounts – as key stations of amplification – 
sought to shape and guide what they considered to be proportionate public responses. In this 
endeavour, they used both using factual and inferential messages. The principles of CERC as a 
further explanatory lens supported an understanding of how risk communication strategies were 
deployed at different stages of each emergency. SARF and CERC proved useful starting points 
to frame social media in relation to established emergency and risk communication theories 
(Rickard et al., 2013; Sellnow and Seeger, 2013).  
Our findings regarding the different communication strategies supported by Twitter messages 
clearly reflect some of the good practice elements suggested by the CERC model (e.g. 
uncertainty reduction, self-efficacy). The application of the model illustrated the intention of 
LGAs to accelerate the transitions between emergency management stages whenever possible 
(riots) or show preparedness for next stages when transitions could not be controlled (snow). 
Although citizen responses to official LGA tweets were not the focus of this paper, further good 
practice was evident as many tweets sought to involve wider community responses; such 
community engagement tweets posted at the earlier stages during the riots constituted close to 
30% of all messages. Hence, depending on the nature and stage of an emergency, there might be 
different opportunities to identify risk sources and guide public behaviour.  
Another useful aspect of the CERC model is the opportunity to retrospectively evaluate a dataset 
of social media posts and draw lessons for the development of future emergency communication 
capabilities. Given that interest in social media monitoring tools is rising, the CERC model can 
be a useful diagnostic framework to strengthen the connection between pre-crisis and evaluation. 
For example, through collecting and analysing responses, it might be possible to observe how 
messages aiming at risk attention and re-iteration of self-efficacy were actually received by 
digital publics. This could allow for: (1) a more in-depth assessment of the impact of messages 
like tweets beyond volume effects and measures of vitality (e.g. number of retweets) as have 
been considered thus far (Sutton et al., 2013), and (2) an understanding of wider information 
flows around an emergency in which authorities were not directly involved in (e.g. Twitter users 
organising the riots clean-up campaign).  
Although SARF and CERC were useful as a conceptual scaffolding for the analysis of this paper, 
further development of risk communication models is needed to better take into account the 
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immediacy and non-linear nature of social media interactions. SARF assigns a key role to the 
media in driving amplification processes but now there are many more social stations of 
amplification, such as the LGAs in this analysis, which are increasingly enjoined to 
communicate risk directly to their followers, with selective reference to traditional media 
sources. Furthermore, the CERC model’s assumptions that emergencies evolve in a predictable 
and systematic way might not always fit to the blurred Twitter audiences that might be observing 
or engaging during an emergency without clear boundaries.  
7. Conclusion 
In this article, we examined how Twitter was used with the aim of increasing awareness over 
emerging weather risks (snowfalls) or reducing the effect of a man-made crisis (riots). Despite 
the fact that tweets were brief and unavoidably ‘terse’, they were deployed extensively in the two 
crisis management situations in ways that reflect a range of strategies and that are sensitive to 
different stages in the crisis – both in terms of volume and content of messages. As institutional 
learning processes with regard to social media are progressing through different levels of 
sophistication (Mergel and Bretschneider 2013), our findings can be informative for different 
public engagement contexts.  
There are certain limitations that need to be acknowledged. The messages in our dataset came 
from LGAs with diverse communication needs, urgency, local impact of the two emergencies or 
available resources. As such, we are not able to fully reveal the choices involved in broadcasting 
specific types of content; this might obscure our understanding of the extent to which Twitter use 
represented a planned response or ad hoc creativity by local government officers. Since 
emergency management is more than the application of frameworks to inform and guide the 
public, we can also not be fully aware of actions taken but not communicated through Twitter’s 
brief updates. Furthermore, our approach is based on qualitative exploration of content and risk 
expressions over a significant amount of tweets. We were not able to capture the full range of 
information flows involving mainstream and other social media or even within Twitter during 
the two emergencies. We also need to take into account that, despite its large user base in the 
UK, Twitter is not the only important source of emergency information activity and its use is not 
expected to reach the general public that needs to be informed during emergencies.  
A final point of departure for future work is related to the observation by Turoff et al. (2013) that 
social media may not be as useful for effective collaboration as systems directly designed for 
crisis planning and response. Social media certainly entail opportunities for mobilisation like 
cleaning the streets during the riots, however we are not fully aware of how these activities can 
be planned or encouraged more systematically and what is the relationship with emergency 
systems that are based on closed information flows. Understanding how social media can be 
integrated with back-office systems of planning and control offers an important aspect for future 
work. 
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